PROJECT TITLE :

Incentivizing Signal and Energy Cooperation in Wireless Networks

ABSTRACT:

We tend to consider a two-hop wireless network where the supply(s) within the network have the ability to wirelessly power the relay(s) who conjointly have their own data to send to the destination. Considering the very fact that each node within the network aims to maximise its own metric, we adopt a game theoretic approach that foresees offering relaying of the sources’ knowledge in exchange for energy provided to the relays, and simultaneously providing energy to the relays in exchange for their relaying services. We have a tendency to first study a Stackelberg competition with the only relay node as the leader, and investigate the impact of having multiple source nodes in the system. We tend to next study the reciprocal Stackelberg game with the only supply because the leader, and investigate the inter-relay competition with multiple relays. We tend to notice that within the Stackelberg games, the leader can improve its individual utility by influencing the follower’s call accordingly, even a lot of so when there are multiple followers. We have a tendency to next formulate a noncooperative game between the source and therefore the relay and show the existence of a distinctive Nash equilibrium by an appropriate pricing mechanism. The equilibrium maximizes the overall utility of the network and permits the destination to settle on how abundant knowledge to receive from every node.