PROJECT TITLE :

Novel Test-Mode-Only Scan Attack and Countermeasure for Compression-Based Scan Architectures

ABSTRACT:

Scan design is a de facto style-for-testability (DfT) technique that enhances access throughout manufacturing test method. But, it can conjointly be used as a back door to leak secret info from a secure chip. In existing scan attacks, the secret key of a secure chip is retrieved by using both the practical mode and therefore the take a look at mode of the chip. These attacks can be thwarted by applying a reset operation when there's a switch of mode. But, the mode-reset countermeasure can be thwarted by using solely the take a look at mode of a secure chip. During this paper, we perform a close analysis on the take a look at-mode-solely scan attack. We propose attacks on a complicated encryption commonplace (AES) style with a basic scan architecture as well as on an AES style with a sophisticated DfT infrastructure that contains decompressors and compactors. The attack results show that indeed the secure chips are vulnerable to test-mode-only attacks. The secret key will be recovered inside one s even in the presence of decompressors and compactors. We have a tendency to then propose new countermeasures to thwart these attacks. The proposed countermeasures incur minimal value while providing high success rate.